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WILLEM LABUSCHAGNE
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A. Janssen and Elinor Ostrom 
Working Together: Collective 
Action, the Commons, and 
Multiple Methods in Practice 
(NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010)
The prosaic style of this book belies the 
thoroughness of its scholarship and the immediacy 
of its relevance to political policy in New Zealand 
and elsewhere. At one level, it may be read as an 
account of both small-‘n’ case studies and large-
‘N’ comparative studies that have looked at the 
manner in which common resources are managed 
and exploited around the world. These studies show 
that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, 
and that neither nationalisation nor privatisation 
is necessary to ensure sustainability of common 
resources. At a metalevel, the authors discuss the 
accessibility and availability of data for various 
kinds of research, ultimately making a convincing 
case in favour of mixed methods in social science 
research.
The phrase ‘mixed methods’ is shorthand 
for an inclusive methodological stance that sees 
a place for qualitative as well as quantitative 
methods, and considers it a virtue to look at a 
given problem from several perspectives. This 
is a pragmatic stance, recognising the variety 
of kinds of data that investigation might yield. 
Case studies involving a small population, for 
example, may not yield the sort of data that is 
amenable to statistical treatment, but may yield 
comprehensible narratives or life scripts from 
which fertile insights may be gained. Computer 
simulations may be devised to test hypotheses 
cheaply before embarking on fieldwork. Among 
the multiple approaches surveyed in the book, I 
was particularly struck by the lucid explanation of 
agent-based modelling.
In what follows I shall not argue the case 
for mixed methods. When the Department of 
Sociology at the local university already offers a 
third-year paper on mixed methods, one realises 
that the battle has been decided in favour of 
methodological pluralism. Nor will I analyse the 
many disparate studies reported in the book; that 
is what the book is for. Instead, I shall pluck at the 
agent-based modelling thread and splice in some 
thoughts about ways to address the limitations of 
current agent models.
HOMO AVARUS
When John von Neumann published the first 
paper on game theory in 1928, he focused on 
zero-sum games – games like chess or ludo or 
rock-paper-scissors, in which one player can win 
only at the cost of the other player losing. To model 
a player in such a game is a simple matter: not 
much of a personality is needed, merely an over-
riding desire to win and a lack of any empathy with 
the loser. Some games afford a range of payoffs, 
in which case the model includes the intention to 
win as much as possible. The terminology applied 
in game theory does not advertise the underlying 
avarice of the model: players are said to maximise 
their expected utility, which sounds both learned 
and morally neutral.
During the Second World War, while trapped 
in the USA by Hitler’s Anschluss, the Austrian 
economist Oscar Morgenstern collaborated with 
von Neumann on a book that became a classic text 
in game theory: Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.1 The over-simplified behaviour of a 
child playing a parlour game somehow grew to be 
regarded as a model of rational decision-making 
in the marketplace and, by virtue of the pervasive 
metaphor that politics is business, became a 
model used to guide both foreign and domestic 
political policy.
The name ‘rational choice theory’ came to be 
applied to the model, thereby elevating its use from 
moral neutrality to a normative ideal: not only was 
the theory used to predict real political behaviour 
such as Kruschev’s response to Kennedy’s 
ultimatum during the Cuban crisis, but it became 
the paradigm in microeconomics. The books of Ayn 
Rand became popular, and several generations of 
commerce students were duly indoctrinated with 
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the bizarre notion that, as Michael Douglas put 
it in the film about Wall Street, “Greed is good.”2 
It was an item of faith among economists that if 
everyone acted self-interestedly to maximise their 
personal gain then a benevolent supernatural 
entity known as the ‘invisible hand’ of the ‘market’ 
would magically ensure that everyone benefitted 
from a good outcome. Having committed to this 
assumption, those realists who observed the 
growth of an economic underclass could take 
comfort in the inference that being wealthy was 
evidence of being superior (since there was 
natural justice in the better player winning the 
game of the marketplace), while the poor and the 
unfortunate must have deserved their misfortune 
by being somehow unfit for success.3 The inherent 
contradiction between the assumption that 
everyone would benefit and the observation that 
many did not, had the usual effect on believers – 
as with any ideology based on a contradiction, the 
believers became missionaries, because every soul 
converted to their cause reassured them that they 
couldn’t, after all, be wrong.
In counterpoint to this intellectual fashion, 
Herbert Simon pointed out during the 1950s 
that being rational in real life would typically 
entail satisficing rather than optimizing – being 
satisfied with enough rather than trying for as 
large a profit as possible.4 A thought experiment 
will illustrate the idea of satisficing. Imagine going 
to the supermarket to buy your visiting Aunt Maud 
a box of breakfast cereal. Confronted by shelves 
with a hundred different kinds of cereal, an 
optimising agent would study each kind in order 
to evaluate which one is the very best value for 
money. A satisficing agent would simply decide 
on an ‘aspiration level,’ in other words what sort 
of price the agent would like to pay, whether the 
cereal should contain raisins, and so on, and then 
would take the first box of cereal that satisfied 
these criteria. The satisficing agent would typically 
be home pouring milk into the bowl of cereal for a 
grateful Aunt Maud while the optimising agent was 
still standing in front of the shelves obsessively 
scribbling notes and trying to decide whether more 
vitamin K is better than more zinc.
Simon’s notion of an agent having bounded 
resources (limited memory, processing ability, 
time) and using a strategy of satisficing instead of 
maximising personal gain was, for four decades, 
drowned out by the Wall Street hymn to greed, 
although recent times have seen a revival of 
Simon’s ideas in the research of Gerd Gigerenzer 
and others.5
THE COMMONS
Consider the problem of managing a shared 
resource. Conventional analyses based on rational 
choice theory predict that the only way to prevent 
individuals from maximising their short-term 
returns to self and thereby overusing a common 
resource (the ‘tragedy of the commons’) is to have 
an external authority impose rules, requiring either 
privatisation or state management. Case studies 
spanning the globe from Mexico to Tanzania have 
tested this prediction, in some cases corroborating 
it but in literally hundreds of cases providing 
counterexamples in the form of local users who 
self-organised to collectively manage common-
pool resources in a successful manner. The 
research reported in Working Together addresses 
such questions as: What are the variables that 
distinguish the success or failure of such collective 
action? Why is one forest in Southern Indiana 
successfully managed by the local community 
while a nearby forest is over-exploited and the 
source of serious conflict between members of 
the community who wish to use forest products as 
a source of income?
It seems clear that co-operation is facilitated 
by the ideal of satisficing rather than maximising. 
Two agents sharing a common resource such as 
firewood can either be content to share or fight it out 
so that the winner takes all. How does the former 
option enter into game theory?
One way to think about successful co-operation 
among individuals managing a common resource 
is that they have played a game that allows a win-
win solution, rather than the zero-sum games with 
which game theory originated. An example of such 
a non-zero-sum game is the ‘prisoner’s dilemma,’ 
invented by Anatol Rapoport. We are to imagine two 
individuals who are held as prisoners in separate 
cells, unable to communicate, and accused of 
being partners in a crime. Each agent has to decide 
whether to ‘co-operate’ with the other agent in 
protesting innocence or to ‘defect’ by betraying the 
other agent. An agent would gain the maximum 
pay-off (say, five tokens) by defecting while the 
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other agent loyally co-operated (and for this loyalty 
received zero tokens). On the other hand, if both 
agents co-operated, they would achieve a win-win 
outcome in which each got three tokens. Finally, if 
both agents simultaneously defected, each would 
gain a single token. The win-win outcome would 
be sufficient for a satisficing agent, whereas an 
optimising agent would play for a maximum gain. 
Indeed, according to rational choice theory each 
player should defect, hypnotised by the prospect of 
gaining a maximal payoff if the other agent turned 
out to be a sucker, and in reality gaining one token 
because all the agents are equally selfish (or so the 
theory supposes).
During the 1980s Robert Axelrod organised 
a tournament in which computer programs 
implementing various strategies competed against 
one another, playing a finitely repeated form of the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game. The winning program 
was that submitted by none other than Anatol 
Rapoport, and it did not cynically defect at every 
opportunity. Instead the program implemented 
a simple tit-for-tat strategy, which began by 
attempting to co-operate and thereafter mimicked 
the decision made by the opponent in the previous 
round. If the tit-for-tat strategy is pitted against an 
opponent who begins by co-operating, it continues 
to co-operate in the next round. If it plays against 
an opponent who defects, it defects in the next 
round, and continues to do so until the opponent 
co-operates. The winning strategy, therefore, was 
not the greedy strategy of maximising personal gain 
but a strategy that was prepared to co-operate as 
long as the other agent also co-operated and that 
punished a failure to co-operate. The tit-for-tat 
strategy may be viewed as an agent content to 
satisfice but not content to be a sucker.
In a game played with an inveterate defector, 
both tit-for-tat and the defecting agent come off 
poorly. It is only when a population has enough 
agents willing to co-operate, at least provisionally, 
that the benefits of satisficing and co-operation 
can be felt. This invites the question: How can we 
improve the agent model to represent agents that 
are prepared to co-operate? The tit-for-tat strategy 
is all right as far as it goes, but it doesn’t explain 
why the agent is prepared to co-operate in the first 
place, nor the mechanisms by which co-operation 
may be facilitated in a community.
BEYOND AUTISTIC AGENTS
My dictionary defines ‘autism’ as a disorder 
characterised by abnormal self-absorption, deficits 
in social interaction and communication, a limited 
range of interests, and repetitive behaviour. It 
seems to me that one could with some justice 
describe the avaricious agent model that has for 
so long dominated economic theory as autistic. 
The model has been shown inadequate both in 
laboratory trials such as Axelrod’s competitions and 
in real-life case studies of successfully co-operating 
communities. Surely it’s time for a change?
Those teaching and studying economics 
themselves realised the need for change a decade 
ago. In 2000, students of economics at the École 
Normale Supérieure in Paris circulated a petition 
calling for an end to autistic economics (Autisme-
Economie). Their action was soon followed by a 
similar petition from their professors. A year later 
twenty seven PhD students in economics at the 
University of Cambridge followed suit, protesting 
against “the uncritical application of mainstream 
methods.”6 (In passing, we may note a paradox: 
despite the growing discontent among academic 
economists, the global economic difficulties of 
2008 were not seized upon as an opportunity to 
change the prevailing economic model; instead, 
governments in New Zealand and the UK came to 
power on a platform of intensifying the dogmatic 
narrowmindedness with which they would apply 
conventional economic solutions to the hard times 
suffered by their voters.)
Laboratory experiments based on prisoners’ 
dilemma games and simulations of the commons 
dilemma have shown that a major factor 
contributing to co-operation is contact between 
agents. In Working Together Poteete et al. write: 
In the lab, once subjects are enabled to talk 
about their puzzle in a face-to-face group, most 
develop joint strategies as well as the trust and 
reciprocity needed to carry out these strategies, 
contrary to the conventional theory. Within 
a few rounds, they reduce overharvesting 
substantially and improve their individual and 
joint outcomes. These findings echo behavior 
in the field where ... many groups that use 
inshore fisheries, forests, irrigation systems, 
and pastures have used communication to 
develop a diversity of norms and rules to enable 
them to reduce overharvesting.7
85Junctures 14, July 2011
Attempts to improve the agent model have 
focused on the learning of norms and have 
implemented this in a fairly simple-minded 
way. A positive or negative value is attached to 
particular types of action in specific situations, 
and this value is then added to or subtracted from 
the objective costs of an action. Changes in the 
magnitude of the value reflect varying degrees of 
commitment to the norm. The principal defect of 
this approach, it seems to me, is that it ignores the 
social scaffolding that underpins the interactions in 
laboratories and field studies. Norms develop out of 
agent interaction rather than being built-in. Agent 
interactions are guided by social scaffolding. This 
social scaffolding arises from a rich architecture of 
emotion in individual agents.
EMOTIONS
What are emotions? One of the surprising 
conclusions to emerge from psychological research 
is that emotions do not all belong to a single 
uniform category. To put it succinctly, emotions 
do not constitute a natural kind.8 Some emotions 
play the roles of internal officers who marshall 
the troops, the troops in this case being a variety 
of physiological and mental processes inside the 
agent. The apprehension you feel when you hear 
a noise in the night causes a narrowing of your 
momentary thought-action repertoire: you hear 
more clearly sounds that normally would not be 
attended to, such as creaks or rustling; goals that 
pertain to safety are activated while other goals 
are deactivated – you no longer feel hungry, you 
lose interest in practising a new skill, you set aside 
thoughts of seduction; conceptual frames shift so 
that the geography of your immediate environment 
contains mental tags labelling an open corridor 
‘dangerous’ and a closet ‘safe;’ memory processes 
are diverted to seek explanations for the possible 
danger, specialised learning systems involving the 
amygdalae are activated, and so on.9
Other emotions have evolved to function 
in a social context by delivering a social signal. 
Consider the ‘Duchenne smile’ – the hard-to-fake 
smile in which small muscles around the eyes take 
part. This expression is not an automatic outer 
manifestation of an inner feeling of happiness. 
Soccer fans who are happy after a goal has been 
scored produce this facial signal only if they are 
facing one another. The same has been observed 
of Olympic athletes who won gold medals and 
who express their evident excitement in this way 
exclusively when interacting with officials or an 
audience.10 People do smile when they are alone, 
but far less often than would be predicted if a smile 
were merely the outward manifestation of an inner 
state – and even then experimental subjects who 
have smiled in solitude have reported visualising 
an audience in their heads. The smile is less an 
expression of an internal feeling than a strategic 
move in an ongoing interaction between organisms. 
More generally, all emotions that are identifiable 
from facial expressions deliver social signals that 
influence the evolving social context.
Such ongoing interactions between individuals 
are crucial for the development of mutual trust, 
norms, and a sense of community. A variety of 
emotions are specifically concerned with moral 
behaviour: not only negative emotions such as 
embarrassment and shame but also positive 
emotions such as elevation, which is the feeling of 
upliftment one gets from doing a good deed.11 In 
order to model the prisoner’s dilemma or the more 
complex problem of sharing a common resource 
in a psychologically realistic fashion, emotions 
need to be included in the model, particularly 
the emotions that act in a strategic fashion to 
reconfigure relationships – because that’s what 
people are doing all the time. Normal people seek 
opportunities to interact with other people, to build 
relationships, to co-operate. One could not have 
built a less accurate model of Homo sapiens than 
game theory’s Homo avarus. Working Together 
helps to drive this point home.
1 John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1944).
2 Oliver Stone dir., Wall Street (1987) Twentieth Century 
Fox.
3 The main reason for the controversy surrounding 
the publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray’s The Bell Curve (NY: Free Press, 1994) was 
that it appeared to be an attempt to justify this social 
Darwinism by demonstrating that socioeconomic 
status correlated with IQ.
4 Herbert Simon, “Rational choice and the structure of the 
environment,” Psychological Review 63 (No. 2, 1956): 
129-138.
86 Junctures 14, July 2011
5 Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhardt Selten, eds., Bounded 
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001).
6 See “A Brief History of the Post-Autistic Economics 
Movement,” http://www.paecon.net/HistoryPAE.htm 
accessed 7 April 2011.
7 Amy R. Poteete, Marco A. Janssen and Elinor Ostrom, 
Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and 
Multiple Methods in Practice (NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 219.
8 Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino, “Emotions in 
the Wild: The situated perspective on emotion” in The 
Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Philip 
Robbins and Murat Aydede, eds., (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 437-453.
9 John Tooby and Leah Cosmides, “The Evolutionary 
Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to 
Internal Regulatory Variables” in Handbook of Emotions, 
Michael Lewis et al., eds., (3rd edition) (NY: The Guilford 
Press, 2008), 114-137.
10 Griffiths and Scarantino, “Emotions in the Wild.”
11 Jon Haidt, “Elevation and the positive psychology of 
morality” in Flourishing: Positive psychology and the life 
well-lived, C. L. M. Keyes & J. Haidt, eds., (Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 275-
289.
